Assessing Horizontal Equity in Medication Treatment Among Elderly Mexicans: Which Socioeconomic Determinants Matter Most? by Maurer, Jürgen
MODELLING SOCIOECONOMIC AND HEALTH 
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH CARE USE:  
A SEMIPARAMETRIC APPROACH 
 
 
Jürgen Maurer 
 
143-2007 
Assessing Horizontal Equity in Medication Treatment Among
Elderly Mexicans: Which Socioeconomic Determinants Matter
Most?
Jürgen Maurer∗
Version: July 2007
Abstract
Many low- and middle-income countries are currently undergoing a dramatic epidemio-
logical transition, with an increasing disease burden due to degenerative noncommunicable
diseases. Inexpensive medication treatment often represents a cost-effective means to pre-
vent, control or cure many of these health conditions. Using micro data from the 2001
Mexican Health and Aging Study, we assess horizontal inequity in medication treatment
among older Mexicans before the introduction of Popular Health Insurance in Mexico. In
doing so, we investigate the role of various dimensions of socioeconomic status for obtaining
indicated medication treatment within a comparatively fragmented health care system that
features relatively high out-of-pocket expenditures. Our empirical analysis suggests health
insurance coverage as a key socioeconomic determinant of indicated medication use with
large and statistically significant positive effects on take-up. The effects of insurance status
thereby clearly dominate any other possible effects of socioeconomic status on medication
treatment. Our results thus highlight the importance of access to reliable health care and
comprehensive coverage for rational medication use in the management of degenerative dis-
eases. In light of this evidence, we expect that recent Mexican health care reforms, which
expand health insurance coverage to the previously uninsured population, will alleviate
socioeconomic gradients in medication treatment among older people in need.
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1 Introduction
Many developing countries are currently experiencing an advancing epidemiological transition
away from primarily communicable diseases to a "dual burden" of both infectious and degen-
erative diseases. In 2001, major degenerative diseases such as cancer, diabetes or heart disease
already accounted for more than one-half of all deaths in low- and middle-income countries,
with cardiovascular disease alone killing nearly three times as many people as AIDS, malaria,
and TB combined (Lopez et al., 2006). The increasing importance of degenerative diseases in
low- and middle-income countries calls for new strategies in the delivery of cost-effective health
care, which should reflect the changing health care demands implied by the epidemiological
transition. In this regard, comprehensive life-style interventions and low-cost disease man-
agement programs are often considered promising tools for controlling major risk factors and
alleviating the impending burden of degenerative noncommunicable diseases. Such interven-
tions seem particularly well-suited for developing country settings, where health care budgets
tend to be especially tight (Jamison et al., 2006a, Jamison et al., 2006b). Yet, to this day, sur-
prisingly little research has been devoted to the health system challenges implied by spreading
noncommunicable disease epidemics throughout the developing world (Behrman et al., 2006).
Hence, relatively little is known about the main micro-level obstacles impeding the take-up of
specific strategies for chronic disease management and risk factor control.
Drug treatments generally constitute an important aspect of comprehensive preventive care
strategies, and some of these seem especially well-suited for long-term disease and risk man-
agement in a developing country setting. Inexpensive medication treatment often represents
an important means to prevent, control or cure many degenerative health conditions. For
example, the low cost and high effectiveness of drugs to prevent, say, the reoccurrence of a
cardiovascular event is likely to make their long-term use highly cost-effective, even in low- and
middle-income countries (Jamison et al., 2006a, Jamison et al., 2006b). Used properly, drugs
may also help older people to function better and enhance personal wellbeing by controlling
many symptoms associated with various diseases.
Making appropriate medication available to everyone in need irrespective of her socioeco-
nomic status is a central desideratum of an accessible, equitable and responsive health care
system. Yet, obstacles such as a lack of relevant health information, high prices coupled with
a lack of insurance coverage or insufficient financial resources, or a general lack of access to
reliable distribution channels like health centers or pharmacies often thwart the actual take-up
of long-term medication treatment for many patients, especially in the developing world.
Mexico can be regarded a case in point with respect to many of these issues. Being an upper-
middle-income country, Mexico is in the fore regarding the shift in the causes of illness in the
developing world, as it has undergone a rapid epidemiological transition over the last several
decades. Between 1955 and 2004, the proportion of deaths attributable to communicable
diseases dropped from 70% to 12%, whereas the corresponding share of noncommunicable
diseases had risen from 23% to 75% (González-Pier et al., 2006). Being mostly degenerative
illnesses, these noncommunicable diseases are especially concentrated among older individuals.
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Cardiovascular diseases are nowadays by far the leading contributor to premature death in
persons age 60+ in Mexico with an associated mortality rate more than four times higher than
that of all communicable diseases (PAHO, 2002). Morbidity has changed similarly, with many
older Mexicans now suffering from several, often chronic health conditions (Palloni et al., 2004).
Estimated prevalence rates for conditions such as hypertension or arthritis amongst individuals
60 years of age and older are well above 20%, with the corresponding rate for diabetes being
close to that level.
Apart from Mexico’s typical epidemiological profile, some institutional characteristics of the
Mexican health care system make it also an interesting case to study. Prior to recent health care
reforms, Mexico’s health system could be characterized as largely fragmented and underfunded
with fairly incomplete insurance coverage for the population at risk. In 2000, around one-half
of the Mexican population was without publicly funded health care insurance which resulted in
comparatively low levels of overall health spending, an elevated share of out-of pocket spending
as well as unequal public resource allocation between the socially insured and those with no
social security coverage (González-Pier et al., 2006). The coexistence of public, private and
social security subsystems with social security coverage limited to workers in the formal sector
is in fact a quite common characteristic of many health care systems in other low- and middle
income countries, especially in Latin America (Cetrángolo et al., 2006). The policy challenges
implied by such a largely fragmented health care system are therefore not exclusive to Mexico.
To remedy the lack of accessibility, equity and responsiveness as well as the occurrence of
excessive out-of-pocket spending on health care, the reform of the Mexican General Health Law
established a System of Social Protection in Health in 2004, including the introduction of a
new scheme of Popular Health Insurance (Seguro Popular de Salud). The Seguro Popular aims
at promoting universal access to social protection in health, by providing subsidized insurance
to the previously uninsured, which covers a package of essential health care interventions,
including essential medication treatment. It is currently still in its implementation phase, with
complete rollout expected to be completed by 2010 (Gakidou et al., 2006, Knaul and Frenk,
2005).1
The present study takes a closer look at socioeconomic inequity in medication treatment
in Mexico prior to the introduction of Seguro Popular. Using data from the 2001 Mexican
Health and Aging Study (MHAS), we assess the impact of various dimensions of socioeconomic
status on indicated drug use of older Mexicans among whom degenerative diseases are naturally
concentrated.
The purpose of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, the present study investigates the
socioeconomic determinants of access to medication treatment - an important component of
chronic disease management - in a middle-income setting. Using Mexico as a typical example
for a fragmented and underfunded health care system, the study assesses to what extent older
patients are able to obtain the medicines they need. In doing so, we also identify which so-
cioeconomic characteristics appear most important for achieving treatment take-up. We thus
1See also Gakidou et al. (2006) for an interim evaluation.
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study the respective role of various dimensions of socioeconomic status to overcome the ob-
stacles implied by a fragmented and underfunded health care system that lacks comprehensive
coverage for the population at risk.
Apart from any potentially useful global lessons, the paper also presents evidence relevant
to the Mexican health policy debate. Particularly, we identify to what extent there were any
gaps in the take-up of medication treatment prior to the introduction of the Seguro Popular
and how these were related to various dimensions of socioeconomic status. Highlighting the
role of insurance status for medication use, our study also provides an ex-ante assessment of the
likely effects that a successful implementation of the Seguro Popular will have on the take-up of
drug treatment among the previously uninsured. It thus allows us to gauge the likely demand
response implied by the rollout of this new insurance scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives some more detailed
background information on the Mexican health care system, particularly as it pertains to
the availability and coverage of medication treatment for the chronically ill. Section 3 briefly
reviews our conceptual framework, highlighting the main ideas underlying our empirical model.
Section 4 introduces the data and gives some details on the exact measures used in the analysis.
Section 5 presents our estimation results. In conclusion, section 6 gives a summary of the
main results as well as a discussion of some potential caveats and the most important policy
implications of the paper.
2 The Mexican Health Care and Pharmaceuticals Market in a
Nutshell
This section briefly highlights some institutional characteristics of the Mexican health care
system with respect to health insurance coverage and access to care. We also present a short
review of how these institutional features affect the coverage of pharmaceuticals and their
delivery to patients.2
2.1 The Mexican Health Care System
Prior to the introduction of the Seguro Popular in 2004, the Mexican health care system
was widely regarded as comparatively fragmented, underfunded and inequitable. In Mexico,
large social insurance institutions provide health care for formally employed workers and their
relatives, for whom social insurance is compulsory. Formal workers of private companies are
typically covered by the largest social insurer, the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS,
Mexican Social Security Institute); while government employees are covered by the Instituto
de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE, Institute of Social
Security and Services for Government Workers). The major social security agencies operate
2A full description of the Mexican health care system is beyond the scope of this paper. OECD (2005a)
gives a more complete overview the Mexican health care system, while Moise and Docteur (2007) provide an
extensive review of the pharmaceutical market in Mexico.
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their own health facilities, which can be used by their beneficiaries mostly free of charge. Social
insurance coverage does therefore not simply imply reimbursement for health care spending,
but affects health care delivery directly through the default provider. In 2001 - the base year
for our analysis - IMSS insured more than 45 million Mexicans, with a further 10 million
government employees covered by the ISSSTE; IMSS and ISSSTE together covered around
95% of Mexico’s socially insured population, with the remaining 5% being insured via smaller
social security agencies, which include the navy (NAVY), the Ministry of Defense (DEFENSE)
and Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) among others.
Private health insurance has not been very widespread in Mexico. Just around 3% of the
population had any form of private health insurance and roughly half of that was accounted
for by employer subsidized group plans. To expand coverage, the government introduced two
voluntary health insurance programs in 1997, the Incorporacion Voluntaria al Regimen Obliga-
torio (Voluntary Incorporation to the Obligatory Regime) for the self-employed and the Seguro
de Salud para la Familia (Health Security for the Family) for the workers in the informal sector.
Yet, registration into these programs has been minimal, as it has generally been considered too
expensive to buy into (Moise and Docteur, 2007).
Despite the fact that IMSS and ISSSTE offer free services to their beneficiaries, the private
medical care market has not been only used by the uninsured. Rather, some social security
beneficiaries also relied on the private sector for complementary service delivery. In fact, the
private sector encompasses many service providers of differing quality, ranging from specialty-
trained physicians and high-technology medical centers serving the wealthy to unregulated and
unsupervised private physicians without specific training that deliver health care mostly to the
uninsured (Barraza-Lloréns et al., 2002).
In sum, just over half the Mexican population had any health insurance coverage prior to
the 2004 reform, mostly tied to formal employment. The other half of the population, i.e.
those outside the formal sector, generally had no insurance coverage, as the social insurers only
covered formally employed workers and their relatives and other affordable forms of health
insurance were generally unavailable (OECD, 2005a). The uninsured mainly relied on state
health care services through the ministry of health which were generally subject to a socioeco-
nomic evaluation at the time of treatment and may have charged some user fees. Alternatively,
the uninsured could seek care in the private medical care market which was generally for-profit,
charging fees for service. The fragmented nature of the Mexican health care system as well as
its lack of comprehensive insurance coverage resulted in a considerable degree of inequity, with
both a high incidence of out-of-pocket health care spending as well as a general underutilization
of services concentrated among the uninsured (OECD, 2005a).3
To remedy the disadvantaged situation of the uninsured, the reform of the General Health
Law, which came into effect in January 2004, established - amongst other things - the Seguro
3More than 50% of health care spending was directly financed by households and went into the private
sector. As a consequence of the general lack of affordable private health insurance, more than 95% of these
expenditures where financed through direct out of pocket payments and less than 5% through prepaid insurance
(Barraza-Lloréns et al., 2002).
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Popular. The Seguro Popular will provide health services and cover essential medical care as
well as some high-complexity interventions for all uninsured households after a legally mandated
seven year phase-in period (Gakidou et al., 2006). It is expected to be fully in effect by 2010.
The Seguro Popular is publicly subsidized, but also requires a means-tested annual payment
from affiliated families, with an exemption for families in the lower two income deciles. In
addition to providing some financial protection for the previously uninsured, it is also hoped
that the Seguro Popular will alleviate underutilization of health care and help to increase care
use among those in need.
2.2 Pharmaceutical Coverage and Delivery in Mexico
The fragmented and underfunded nature of the Mexican health care system has affected all
forms of care delivery, including the coverage of pharmaceuticals and their delivery to patients.
On the one hand, social insurance beneficiaries can obtain most prescription drugs free of
charge, as long as they are obtained from an agency-run pharmacy. Thus, the social insurers
do not generally require any cost-sharing for prescribed medication covered by their respective
formularies.4 Yet, some social security beneficiaries nonetheless chose to buy their medication
in private pharmacies at full cost, as they may otherwise have to wait for the drugs to become
available in their provider pharmacies or may not get the brand type they wanted (Moise and
Docteur, 2007).
The uninsured, on the other hand, have mainly had to rely on purchasing their medication
from private pharmacies. While drugs used for inpatient treatment in Ministry of Health
or state health service facilities have been generally free of charge, prerefrom the uninsured
patients had to pay out-of-pocket for continued drug treatment after discharge, even with
regard to the same care episode. Other medication, like the ones used for chronic disease
management, also had to be bought at private pharmacies and paid for out-of-pocket. Overall,
these arrangements have led to a very large share for out-of-pocket spending on medications,
comprising around 90% (OECD, 2005b) of total pharmaceutical spending in Mexico.
Access barriers to health care in general and incomplete coverage of pharmaceuticals in
particular posed serious threats to rational medication use, especially for the uninsured. Specif-
ically, self-medication has become a widespread phenomenon in Mexico. Pagán et al. (2006)
show that self-medication was prevalent in all socioeconomic strata of the population, but
most widespread among individuals with no health insurance coverage. On the one hand,
self-medication may in fact be beneficial, as it may enhance the take-up of medication treat-
ment among patients with no access to primary care (WHO, 2000). On the other hand, using
pharmaceuticals without prior consultation with a doctor may also result in poor disease-
medication-matches and inappropriate drug use that does not accurately reflect a patient’s
true health care needs. Similarly, lack of coverage may result in inappropriate substitution
4Note that the formularies of the two major insurers, IMSS and ISSSTE, are fairly similar, with all listed
drugs being also included in the interinstitutional basic formulary, the Cuadro Basico (Basic Coverage)(Moise
and Docteur, 2007).
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between drugs and is likely to lead to no and/or incomplete take-up of indicated medication
treatments. Moreover, such forms of underutilization are likely to be further exacerbated by
the comparatively high income-adjusted price-level of pharmaceuticals in Mexico (Danzon and
Furukawa, 2003, Ministry of Health, 2005). The problem of underutilization is then particu-
larly relevant for the case of risk factor control. Many risk factors, such as hypertension, are
largely asymptomatic and may thus result in low perceived health care need.
In addition to covering a package of 249 essential and 17 high-complexity health interven-
tions (González-Pier et al., 2006), the Seguro Popular also provides coverage for almost 200
pharmaceuticals, with the list of essential medicines being continuously revised.5 As such,
the Seguro Popular will not only enhance access to primary and secondary health care, but
also facilitate the use of pharmaceuticals for disease management and risk factor control. It is
therefore interesting to investigate to what extend the uninsured were able to use alternative
strategies for take-up, such as self-medication, before the introduction of the Seguro Popular.
Also, assessing the partial effects of insurance status on indicated medication use will allow us
to gauge the likely effects of the Seguro Popular on take-up for the previously uninsured.
3 Conceptual Framework and Control Variables
We use a simple version of the behavioral model of health care utilization as the basis for our
empirical analysis of horizontal inequity in medication treatment (Andersen, 1968, Andersen,
1995). The behavioral model features a clear distinction between care need on the one hand
and enabling factors on the other. Assessing the extent of socioeconomic inequity in medication
use thus requires an appropriate need-adjustment. Specifically, we would like to identify the
importance of different socioeconomic enabling factors for the take-up of medication treatment
only for those who do require such treatment.6 We therefore have to condition on the respon-
dents’ background health in order to properly identify potential gaps in beneficial medication
treatment. To do so, we confine our analysis to individuals with self-reported doctor-diagnosed
health conditions that warrant some form of medication treatment.
This strategy resembles the disease-based approaches that have been recently suggested by
the OECD among others (Goldman and Smith, 2005, Jacobzone, 2003, Merino-Juárez, 2004).
In the Mexican context, the disease-based approach appears fairly conservative. Specifically,
conditioning on doctor-diagnosed health conditions will - if anything - understate the extent of
a possible socioeconomic gradient in the use of pharmaceuticals. The reason for this is that any
preexisting gradients in access to general health care, testing or screening, which might affect
the availability of a diagnosis, tend to lead to higher rates of undiagnosed, and thus untreated
conditions among disadvantaged groups.7 Similarly, such gradients make it also more likely
5http://www.salud.gob.mx/unidades/dgpfs/catalogo_medicamentos.htm (accessed on 10/07/2007).
6See also Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) regarding the treatment of "need" vs. "non-need" determinants
of health care utilization in health equity analysis.
7Pagán et al. (2007) show that such preexisting gradients may indeed be important, as individuals with
social health insurance coverage are much more likely to use preventive screenings that individuals without
insurance.
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that among the disadvantaged, only the more severe causes obtain a diagnosis and thus feature
in our estimation samples. Both of these issues suggest a lower bound interpretation of any
estimated socioeconomic gradients in medication use conditional on having some diagnosis.
Over and above conditioning on a reported diagnosis, we also include a set of age controls
into our empirical model to account for the progressive nature of some of these conditions.
Finally, we also account for comorbidities and potentially important gender differences in the
determination of care need.
Turning to the enabling factors, we aim at capturing various dimensions of socioeconomic
status to assess which socioeconomic determinants matter most for the take-up of indicated
medication use. Our first enabling factor intends to capture potentially important differences in
drug use between rural and urban areas. It is well-known that there are vast regional differences
in health system performance in Mexico, which are also likely to affect the availability and use
of pharmaceuticals. Specifically, as access to health care is clearly related to the available health
infrastructure such as resident doctors, hospitals and pharmacies, it is essential to control for
differences between rural and urban settings in our empirical model.
Our second enabling factor captures individual differences in human capital, which is likely
to affect a patient’s capacity to assess and evaluate the benefits of medication treatment. We
thus consider human capital as a potentially important determinant for (self-) medication take-
up and treatment compliance, even if the available evidence from other countries is mixed (Case
et al., 2004; Goldman and Smith, 2002, 2005; Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg, 2002).
Our third set of enabling factors is mainly motivated by the large share of out-of-pocket
expenditures on pharmaceuticals in Mexico. Specifically, we include controls for both income
and wealth in our model to capture potentially important differences in individuals’ capacities
to pay for medication out-of-pocket.
The final set of socioeconomic controls directly relates to the institutional arrangements of
the Mexican health system, namely whether the respondent has any social insurance coverage.
The potential effects of insurance coverage on the take-up of medication treatment may thereby
operate through various channels, including better access to primary care and screening pro-
grams, higher care quality and better disease monitoring as well as more generous prescription
benefits, such as free prescription medication from agency-run pharmacies. Highlighting the
importance of insurance coverage relative to other enabling factors such as income or wealth
may provide some additional insights on the likely effectiveness of introducing government-
sponsored health insurance, such as the Seguro Popular, for ensuring adequate medication
treatment for the previously uninsured.
Having health insurance coverage is often suspected to be endogenous with respect to health
care use. Yet, as highlighted previously, there has basically not been a market for private health
insurance in Mexico, and social insurance coverage used to be closely tied to formal employment,
in which case it is compulsory. As such, Mexican workers have usually not had the choice to
directly buy into health insurance. Rather, the relevant decision used to be whether to formalize
or not, which is largely influenced by a worker’s labor market opportunities as well as other
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considerations related to social protection more generally, such as unemployment insurance or
pensions, as well as to the financing of coverage, which has included some payroll taxes on
part of the workers (Perry et al., 2007). Hence, the decision of whether or not to obtain any
health insurance coverage is only indirectly under the respondents’ control. Beyond it, the
absence of choice with respect to take-up of medical insurance is even more pronounced among
the older population. The reason for this is that most older individuals are insured through a
relative, such as a spouse, daughter or son, who in turn, face the decision on whether or not
to formalize rather than to just take-up health insurance. Given the lack of direct control over
one’s insurance status and the absence of an obvious instrument for the decision to formalize,
we abstract from the potential endogeneity of health insurance status and treat it as exogenous.
4 Data and Measures
4.1 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the first wave of the Mexican Health and Aging
Study (MHAS) collected in 2001. The MHAS is a nationally representative sample of the
non-institutionalized older Mexican population (age 50+) and their spouses, the latter being
included in the study regardless of their age. Similar in design to the US Health and Retirement
Study, the MHAS collects extensive demographic, economic and health-related information.
The MHAS thus represents an ideal data source for analyzing any socioeconomic differentials
in health care utilization. For our analysis, we only use observations on individuals aged 40 or
older who have no missing item on any of the variables employed (N=14397).8
4.2 Measures
4.2.1 Outcomes of Interest
We analyze the effects of socioeconomic status on the take-up of medication treatment con-
ditional on care need. To account for the latter, we select respondents who reported to have
been doctor-diagnosed for at least one out of the following six conditions: Arthritis, diabetes,
heart attack, hypertension, respiratory disease or stroke. In the estimations, we thus only con-
sidered respondents with health conditions for which drug treatment is generally believed to
be beneficial. For arthritis, the use of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, slow-acting drugs,
corticosteroids or immunosuppressive drugs is often indicated. Diabetics, on the other hand,
generally need to rely on antihyperglycemic drugs or insulin replacement therapy if dieting and
exercise appear to be insufficient to control the blood sugar level. We thus enquired whether
those with self-reported doctor-diagnosed diabetes used either antihyperglycemic drugs or in-
sulin or both. For heart attack patients, we also consider two forms of medication treatment.
8Note that the deletion of observations due to item non-response was performed after incorporating the
MHAS-provided imputations for total individual income and total household wealth (see Wong and Espinoza
(2004) for methodological details regarding the imputations).
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Firstly, we code the use of any heart medication such as nitroglycerin, beta-blockers, ACE
inhibitors, and lipid-lowering drugs, which are generally indicated following a heart attack,
as any drug use among heart attack patients. In addition, we also count patients as using
medication treatment if they reported carrying any medication for heart/chest pain, such as
aspirin, which substantially increases the probability of survival in case of a further heart at-
tack. For respondents with hypertension, we investigate the use of antihypertensive drugs to
control blood pressure. The next health conditions we consider are respiratory diseases such as
asthma or emphysema for which the use of anti-inflammatory drugs such as corticosteroids is
often indicated. Finally, we consider respondents with a doctor-diagnosed stroke or transient
ischemic attack. For those, the use of antiplatelet drugs is generally useful to prevent further
onsets of such conditions.
Given this classification of patients as treated or untreated, we follow two distinct ap-
proaches for our empirical analysis. The first approach is based on a pooled sample of all
respondents indicating at least one health condition. For this sample, we assess the extent
of socioeconomic differences in medication use based on two different concepts of treatment
take-up. On the one hand, we investigate whether the respondents used any medication for at
least one of their conditions ("any use"), capturing the notion of "access" to any medication
treatment. On the other hand, we also assess whether or not these respondents reported "any
gap" in medication treatment. We thereby define "any gap" as reporting at least one untreated
health condition. The second concept therefore gauges the extent of "incomplete take-up" of
medication treatment.
The second approach is truly disease-based in the sense that we consider only one disease
at a time. Specifically, we estimate models of medication use for each of the above six health
conditions separately, where the corresponding estimation samples only include respondents
that indicate the respective condition under consideration. Estimating such disease-specific
models has the advantage that the two concepts of "any use" and "any gap" collapse into a single
variable, namely whether the condition under consideration is medicated or not. Depending
on the prevalence rate of the respective health condition at hand, the increased specificity of
the disease-based approach results in much smaller sample sizes, though, which are likely pose
a challenge with respect to estimation precision.
Table I presents sample means for the indicators defining our sample selections as well
as all of the associated outcome measures. Around 55% of all MHAS respondents reported
suffering from at least one doctor-diagnosed health condition, leading to a pooled estimation
sample of size N=7917. Among these, 74% reported using medication for at least one of their
health conditions ("any use"). At the same time, 40% of those respondents reported at least
one untreated health condition ("any gap"), i.e. less than complete take-up of medication
treatment. Table I also gives a more detailed breakdown by disease: 19% of the MHAS
respondents reported a doctor-diagnosed arthritis, resulting in a disease-specific estimation
sample of N=2755 respondents. Out of those, 58% stated some drug use to treat their arthritis.
Similarly, 15% of the full sample reported suffering from diabetes (N=2181), with 86% percent
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of those indicating the use of either antihyperglycemic drugs or insulin replacement therapy.
The prevalence rate of heart attacks, on the other hand, is fairly small with only 3.3% of the
full sample (N=473) reporting a corresponding diagnosis. Among those, 71% also reported
using some drug for their heart condition. The condition with the highest prevalence rate
is hypertension (37%, N=5307), with an associated take-up rate of 71% for antihypertensive
drugs. Finally, around 6% of the respondents reported some respiratory condition (N=872),
and 2.6% reported a stroke (N=370), with around one half of those respondents reporting some
medication treatment for their respective condition (47% and 50%, respectively).
Altogether, more than one half of the older Mexican population report some health condi-
tion, with a substantial fraction also indicating no or less than complete take-up of medication
treatment. The prevalence rates for the various health conditions vary substantially within our
sample, with chronic diseases being considerably more prevalent than acute events survived.
Interestingly, the take-up rates of medication treatment feature substantial variation, too, rang-
ing from fairly comprehensive take-up of diabetes treatment to comparatively low drug use for
respiratory conditions.
4.2.2 Control Variables
Following the conceptual framework outlined in the previous section, our set of control variables
can be broadly grouped into two categories, aligned with health care need on the one hand and
enabling factors on the other. Regarding the former, our estimations include dummy variables
for ten year age bands (50-59, 60-69 and 70+, with 40-49 being the omitted category) to account
for the progressive nature of some of the underlying conditions. We also construct a dummy
variable indicating the presence of multiple conditions to control for comorbidities.
Moreover, all of our empirical models also include a gender dummy. Gender is in fact a
hard case for categorization within the simple dichotomy of need vs. enabling factors suggested
by the behavioral model. Clearly, gender may capture some underlying biological differences
related to the severity of a specific health condition and thus be a need indicator. At the
same time, gender also constitutes an important aspect of socioeconomic status and may thus
be counted as an enabling factor, too. Given these difficulties regarding the categorization of
gender, we include it for need-adjustment in all of our models, but also report its estimated
partial effects along with those of the other controls classified as enabling factors.
In this regard, the previous discussion has highlighted urban vs. rural environments, hu-
man capital, financial resources and insurance status as potentially important socioeconomic
determinants of medication use. In terms of measurement, our models include two indicator
variables for the size of the respondent’s residence. Specifically, we control for whether the
respondent lives in a city of medium size (15000-100000 inhabitants) or in a bigger city (more
than 100000 inhabitant), with rural areas (1-14999 inhabitant) forming the omitted category.
To control for the effects of human capital, we construct four education categories - roughly
corresponding to the quartiles of completed years of schooling in the full sample - which in-
dicate whether the respondent has spent 2-3 years, 4-6 years or more than 6 years in school
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(with no or 1 year of schooling being the omitted category). Similarly, we construct indicator
variables for the respondents’ income and wealth quartile. Finally, we constructed a dummy
variable indicating whether the respondent has any health insurance. This indicator variable
takes on a value of one if the respondent reports coverage under at least one of the following
schemes, IMSS, ISSSTE, NAVY/DEFENCE/PEMEX, private insurance or any other type of
health insurance, and is zero otherwise. In addition, we also constructed an indicator for mul-
tiple insurance coverage, i.e. whether or not a respondent is covered by more than one of the
aforementioned schemes.
Table II presents sample means for all control variables used in the analysis for the full
as well as all estimation samples. By and large, our estimation samples seem quite similar to
the overall MHAS sample, although some minor differences emerge. As one would expect, the
estimation samples tend to be somewhat older than the full sample. This reflects the fact that
we consider mostly degenerative conditions, whose prevalence rates naturally increase with age.
Also, the estimation samples mirror well-known gender patterns of disease, with a somewhat
higher relative share of women in all disease categories, but heart attack and stroke. Regarding
our socioeconomic controls, the estimation samples are slightly more urban, somewhat less
educated, and have slightly lower income and wealth. At the same time, the estimation samples
include more respondents with any health insurance coverage. Concerning this matter, the
table also presents a more detailed account of the specific types of health insurance underlying
our binary insurance indicator. IMSS is clearly the most widespread type of health insurance,
covering around 50% of the respondents in the various samples. ISSSTE, in turn, covers around
15% of the respondents. The remaining categories, NAVY/DEFENCE/PEMEX, private health
insurance and other health insurance are all comparatively small, each covering around 2-3%
of the samples. Altogether, around 60-75% of the respondents report to have some form health
insurance coverage, with the exact fraction depending on the respective estimation sample.
Finally, around 5-7% of the respondents have the right to medical attention under more than
one insurance scheme.
5 Results
5.1 Pooled Regressions
We start by investigating the individual associations of our different enabling factors with the
take-up of (any or complete) medication treatment conditional on need. We first assess the
extent of any partial gradients along the various socioeconomic dimensions considered here,
before moving to a full model that includes all enabling factors as control variables.
Table III reports the estimated average partial effects of corresponding probit models.
Columns (1)-(6) present the results for any medication use. Specifically, columns (1)-(5) give
the individual associations of each enabling factor separately, whereas column (6) presents the
results for the full model with all controls.
A first noteworthy feature of all the models is that women are significantly more likely to
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take up medication treatment, with estimated partial effects in the order of 5-6 percentage
points.
The individual associations of the pure enabling factors with the need-adjusted take-up of
medication treatment all highlight significant gradients in medication use along each dimension
of socioeconomic status. When considered individually, take-up of medication treatment is
monotonically increasing in each enabling factor and the estimated partial effects are generally
statistically significant. Wald-tests for the joint significance of each individual set of dummy
variables always lead to clear rejections of the hypothesis of "no effect" with associated p-
values far below .01. Moving from a rural to an urban environment increases the probability
of take-up of medication treatment by more than 11 percentage points. Moving from the first
to the fourth quartile of educational attainment, in turn, is associated with a 10.4 percentage
point increase in medication use. Similar gradients are also found along the distributions of
income and wealth, albeit somewhat less pronounced. Ranging from the first to the fourth
quartile of income and wealth increases the take-up of medication treatment by 5.3 and 6.6
percentage points, respectively. Finally, having any form of health insurance is associated with
a 13 percentage points higher take-up rate, whereas multiple insurance coverage adds little, if
anything, to the conditional probability of medication use. Specifically, while the corresponding
point estimate on multiple coverage indicates an increased take-up of around 3.5 percentage
points, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. In sum, we find fairly uniform
socioeconomic gradients along each individual dimension covered by our enabling factors.
We now move to the full model of column (6), which includes all socioeconomic controls
at once. Firstly, women remain significantly more likely to take-up any medication treatment,
even after controlling for all other enabling factors. Specifically, we estimate a statistically
significant partial effect of being female of around 6 percentage points. Also, moving from a
rural to an urban setting still increases the probability of take-up, although the size of the
estimated effect reduces substantially. Conditional on all other controls, medication treatment
is around 5 percentage points more likely in bigger cities than in small villages. A Wald-test for
the joint significance of the two city size controls leads to a p-value of 0.001, clearly rejecting
the null of "no city size effects" at any conventional level.
Similarly, education gradients seem to persist, too, but their size also reduces by around
one-half. The corresponding partial effect of moving from the first to the fourth quartile of
educational attainment is now estimated to be around 4.6 percentage points. A test for joint
significance clearly rejects the null of "no education gradients", with a corresponding p-value
of 0.0000.
Interestingly, none of our income controls remains significant in the full model. While
respondents in the 2nd to 4th income quartile are still somewhat more likely to take-up drug
treatment, the corresponding partial effects are very small, between 1 and 2 percentage points
only. Furthermore, we can also not reject the null of "no income effects" at any conventional
levels of significance (p-value: 0.3692).
The dummies for the 3rd and 4th quartile of household wealth, on the other hand, still
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enter the model significantly with estimated partial effects of 3.1 and 3.5 percentage points,
respectively. Also, with a p-value of 0.0169, we can reject the null hypothesis of "no wealth
gradients" in take-up, albeit only at the 5%-level.
Our last set of enabling factors pertains to the health insurance status of the respondents.
The effect of having any health insurance coverage reduces from 13 percentage points in the
model with insurance only to around 10 percentage points in the full model. Thus, the esti-
mated effect of insurance coverage on the take-up of medication treatment remains fairly large
and is strongly significant. In fact, the estimated partial effect of having some form of insurance
coverage is almost twice as large as the second largest effect of any other of our socioeconomic
control (living in a city with more than 100000 inhabitants). As before, having multiple insur-
ance coverage does not add much to the probability of take-up and the estimated effect is not
statistically significant.
We can now turn to our assessment of "any gaps" in the take-up of medication treatment,
estimating conditional probabilities for reporting at least one untreated condition (columns
(7)-(12)). Looking at such defined gaps in medication treatment, we find negative factor-
specific gradients in the probability of "incomplete take-up" with respect to all enabling fac-
tors (columns (7)-(11)). As in the case of any medication use, all estimated gradients are also
monotonic in the respective enabling factor under consideration.9 Individuals living in urban
areas tend to have a lower probability of having any gap in medication treatment, as do the
better educated, those with higher income and wealth and those with any health insurance
coverage. The factor-specific individual gradients are again most pronounced for city size, edu-
cation and insurance status, and all sets of enabling factors, but income, are jointly significant
at the 1% level. Even income, however, enters the model significantly at the 5%-level (p-value
of 0.0278).
The results for the full model in column (12) portray a similar picture to the one obtained
when analyzing any medication use: The size of the gradient with respect to each enabling factor
reduces relative to the factor-specific gradients, but remains fairly sizable and statistically
significant for city size (p-value: 0.0107), education (p-value: 0.0000), and health insurance
status (p-value: 0.0000). The effects of income and wealth are again much less pronounced,
and both sets of controls do not enter the model significantly, with corresponding p-values
of 0.4424 and 0.1594, respectively. Among all enabling factors, health insurance coverage has
again the largest effect on take-up. Its estimated partial effect of -12 percentage points is almost
twice as large as the second largest effect of any socioeconomic control (3rd and 4th quartile
of educational attainment).
Altogether, we find coherent evidence for important socioeconomic gradients in the take-up
of medication treatment based on a pooled estimation sample of respondents indicating some
form of care need. While the data reveal significant monotonic factor-specific gradients for
all enabling factors under considerations, our full model, which includes all these factors at
9Note also, that women have a lower probability of having any gap in medication treatment, which again
indicates more medication use among females.
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once, identified city size, education, and especially insurance status as the most important
socioeconomic determinants for increased take-up of (any or complete) medication treatment.
5.2 Disease-specific Analysis
We now proceed by adopting a truly disease-based approach to refine our results and investigate
their robustness across different health conditions. Table IV presents estimated partial effects
for six full models that include all enabling factors, one separate model for each of the six
health conditions.
For most of our socioeconomic controls, the disease-specific regressions portray a less clear-
cut picture than the pooled analysis. For example, while women are significantly more likely
to take-up medication treatment for some chronic diseases such as arthritis, diabetes and
hypertension, we do not find any statistically significant effects for gender for respondents
reporting a heart attack or respiratory disease, and a fairly large, negative and statistically
significant effect for respondents reporting stroke.
Similarly, we do also not find an entirely uniform picture for the effects of city size. Most
of the estimated partial effects are insignificant with point estimates indicating higher or lower
take-up depending on the particular condition under consideration. Yet, whenever city size
enters the model significantly - as in the cases of arthritis (p-value: 0.0004) and diabetes (p-
value: 0.001) - the estimated partial effects indicate higher take-up rates in larger municipalities,
at least relative to the rural baseline category.
Also, the estimation results for educational attainment display a mixed pattern, rendering it
difficult to draw strong conclusions. However, whenever our set of education controls enter the
model significantly, that is for arthritis (p-value: 0.0412) and hypertension (p-value: 0.0019)
and at the 10%-level for diabetes (p-value: 0.0980) and stroke (p-value: 0.077), the estimated
effects are always positive and in some cases fairly large in size. For example, being in the
highest quartile of the education distribution increases the conditional probability for the take-
up of stroke treatment by 20 percentage points relative to the 1st education quartile.
Interestingly, our set of income controls do not enter any model significantly, with the lowest
p-value obtained for the case of arthritis treatment (p-value: 0.06). In this case, however,
our estimated coefficients have the expected sign, indicating a higher take-up of medication
treatment among respondents in the 2nd to 4th quartile relative to the bottom 25% of the
income distribution.
Also, the evidence regarding any important wealth gradients is weak at best. Our set of
wealth controls does not enter any model with statistical significance, with the exception of
hypertension (p-value: 0.0273). This rejection, however, is entirely due to the significantly
lower take-up rates of respondents in the 2nd quartile of the wealth distribution relative to the
omitted categories (the 1st quartile).
So far, the disease-specific approach has only delivered mixed evidence for socioeconomic
inequity in medication treatment, with some indication for small effects of city size and educa-
tion. Our final set of controls relating to the respondents’ insurance status, however, displays an
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extremely coherent pattern across all disease categories. Having any health insurance coverage
always increases the probability of medication treatment take-up statistically significantly, and
often with very sizable effects. Specifically, our point estimates for the partial effects of having
any health insurance coverage on indicated drug use are 11.7 percentage points for arthritis,
3.4 percentage points for diabetes, 22.7 percentage points for heart attack, 11.9 percentage
points for hypertension, 7.8 percentage points for respiratory diseases and 13.4 percentage
points for stroke. Thus, the size of the estimated effects of insurance status clearly dominate
those of all other enabling factors, in addition to being estimated fairly precisely. Furthermore,
the disease-specific models also confirm our previous evidence regarding the effects of multiple
health insurance coverage. Having the right to medical attention under more than one scheme
does not seem to increase the probability of medication treatment any further. Its estimated
partial effects are of varying sign and remain statistically insignificant throughout.
5.3 Regressions with Detailed Insurance Controls
Given the central importance of health insurance coverage for the take-up of drug treatment and
its clear dominance relative to the other enabling factors, we scrutinize the effects of insurance
coverage further by re-running all of our full models, replacing the simple binary insurance
indicator by a more detailed set of dummy variables that also indicate the respective source
of coverage. Table V presents the estimated partial effects of these detailed insurance controls
for all of these regressions. Although the relatively low prevalence of some of the insurance
categories such as NAVY/DEFENCE/PEMEX, private insurance and other insurance makes it
fairly challenging to obtain precise estimates for these insurance types, a remarkably consistent
picture emerges: Having health insurance coverage leads to higher take-up rates of indicated
medication treatment, largely irrespective of the exact type of coverage. Particularly, whenever
statistically significant, the impact of all types of health insurance coverage on medication
take-up is positive. Note only their sign, but also the size of the estimated partial effects
is remarkable similar across insurance types. Specifically, associated Wald-tests for the null
hypothesis of "identical partial effects for all insurance categories" always fail to reject at
any conventional level of significance. Thus, although our aggregate insurance indicator gives
clearly the most weight to the largest provider, the IMSS, our disaggregated analysis shows
that any form of coverage is beneficial for the take-up of medication treatment, with fairly
large and often significant positive effects on the probability of indicated medication use. At
the same time, having coverage under more than one scheme, does not seem to increase the
probability of take-up any further. The estimated partial effects for multiple coverage usually
feature the opposite sign, but a similar magnitude to the insurance indicators, implying no
additional effect of multiple coverage on take-up.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
Our study investigated the role of various dimensions of socioeconomic status for the need-
adjusted take-up of medication treatment among older Mexicans with specific health conditions.
We firstly identified strong bivariate socioeconomic gradients in need-adjusted medication use
for city size, education, income, wealth and health insurance status, with higher take-up rates
among more urban and better off respondents. Yet, estimation of a full model featuring all
socioeconomic controls revealed health insurance coverage as the clearly dominating factor for
explaining medication treatment take-up. Health insurance status consistently emerged as the
most important enabling factor for take-up in a variety of models, whether estimated on pooled
data or disease-specific estimation samples. The corresponding effects of insurance coverage
on medication use are thereby fairly sizable. Specifically, having any from of coverage leads to
increased take-up rates that range from 3.4 percentage points for the treatment of diabetes to
more than 20 percentage points for the management of postmyocardial infarction. Moreover,
the strong positive effects of insurance coverage were not limited to beneficiaries of the largest
social insurer, the IMSS. Rather any type of health insurance coverage was found to strongly
affect the take-up of indicated medication treatment.
While we deem our results most conclusive with respect to the beneficial effects of insur-
ance coverage on drug use, a potential caveat regarding our need-adjustment may have led to
some underestimation of the effects of all our enabling factors. Particularly, any preexisting
gradients in access to general health care, testing or screening might affect the availability of
a diagnosis and thereby our sample selection, which may result in an underestimation of any
socioeconomic gradients in medication treatment. Given the interpretation of our estimates as
lower bounds, we conclude that health insurance status is clearly a highly important enabling
factor for medication use, without fully dismissing any potential role for other enabling factors.
Particularly, access to health infrastructure and human capital may also be critical determi-
nants of treatment take-up, and we have presented some evidence regarding their potential
importance, even if it is not fully conclusive.
Overall, our results have important policy implications. Particularly, we have shown that
self-medication is likely to be a fairly imperfect substitute for formal care with respect to
promoting rational medication use. Despite its disproportionately high occurrence among in-
dividuals with low socioeconomic status and lack of insurance coverage (Pagán et al., 2006),
self-medication does not seem to be able to eliminate socioeconomic gradients in indicated
medication use. Rather, access to reliable and responsive health care providers coupled with
appropriate drug benefits seems to be key for enhancing the take-up of medication treatment
among individuals in need. Thus, expanding coverage to the uninsured population appears to
be the most promising health policy response for ensuring rational medication use. Within the
Mexican context, we therefore also expect the Seguro Popular to have a large positive effect on
medication treatment take-up among the newly covered. Thus, apart from any added financial
protection, the Seguro Popular also seems to be a promising intervention for reducing health
care utilization disparities, such as socioeconomic gradients in medication use.
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